

Cuba: II

- In first week: preoccupation with SU
- "horizontal escalation" - esp. if SU troops are killed -
Brest: - Berlin, ^{Prague} Turkey, Qung-Matun, ^{Vietnam} Korea, Pakistan,
Finland; maybe attempt to ~~overthrow~~ ^{Vietnam, Berlin, Hungary,}
Czechs, ^{Don-Rub} Laos.
- No discussion (?) of problems (with SU - or even Castro) in Cuba,
or Conkham.
- Against (except Nife?) - problem was political
not military-strategic
yet "missiles must go"

Aware of problem of explaining w/ missiles in
Turkey was OK, but not in Cuba.

- On horizontal esc: No (?) notion of area; yet
only US "area" of (military) strength - in such areas - and will
certainly inhibit SU ^{in Cuba} action.

With SU area would cover the of US will;
yet it would make deterrence of response SC
action elsewhere less reliable, because it would
create (2) some need to attack/respond as in
US case! (Prestige, will, avoid subordination)
and (b) lead to angry, impulsive, reckless response.

- Concern about legality (not in Admission: an country,
(like de Gaulle) show lack of inhibition about laws "with
US seeing at stake" (How was it?)

any other - because of Admission & domestic opinion:
(Admission, presumably, thought "strong action" would
bring Adm's belief on "leadership.")

- Suggestions: we might give up threats
or (RFE) give/delegate miss to Russ (if SU understand)
let French see in NTS.

August May 923-9252 machine

R 923-1020

2739 Laguna St 94123

can with can April 12

Virginia State: better of family

Wants to discuss

Current
Pres: need to "sing one song." All must support
the final decision. [Consensus:] "Every course
taken, the other would have been better."

[No Bay of Pigs / Bombs.
No Challenger / Thiolol
No VN 64-65 / Ball (Clifford, etc.)]

Such known ~~discrete~~ contradictions: "Another course
~~was~~ perceived as possible, and ~~as~~ as better of it
least one who had the same info as the others —
Discrete is not wholly second-guessing, with
knowledge unavailable at the time..."

Alternative:
could have better
or, shocky,
discreetly
or, regarding ^{hidden} ~~debate~~
or more convincing
investigation...
(very dismissed
as ready?) must

Unlike pres ① Pres is
"questioned" on process of
decision, and a decision
② not just on result
③ not just on result
(process or not
advisable or not)
④ has rights for jobs

|| This, "total ^{or lack of} lack of awareness" of attraction,
or of this possible both effects, "ignorance
is an excuse."

But certain risks — if perceived as such —

- (a) not be chosen
- (b) or at least, not without further investigation
- and (c) exploration, generation of attraction
- and (d) consultation
- and (e) warning to others, who might be endangered
or who have right and
power to block decision.

(- "Why was not Challenger delayed?

Why was not NASA top officials, and Pres, informed?

" were not astronauts told?

Jan 1989: lack of "terrorist warning" to passengers on plane blown up

|| R: Don't say we considered in strike. No attraction."

Ball first reaction: That is as another VC action: mistake or VA.

Jayson: Why don't we relax about it. Treat it as another target.

McN: No mil. that justifying response. What is main response?

July 14th McN to R: We would just have to eat the Rogers. (Previous a bloody mess.
As since better, but
not good.

McN, 20th: Removal right require threats, inhibits to be paid.

Cuba II

Good doctor

To do nothing is dangerous

- Domestically (unsaid)

- Berlin

[Defines "crisis"]

[see Karkovna +
Jensen: risk-
preference]

(Def. of "crisis")

+ "desperation" (vickers)

("Current course is hopeless;

leads to desperation:

consider. of dangerous acts
✓, illegal...

that "might" work; or that

find better, as reactions, than

"doing nothing" (then, hundreds

of risks...) (If right

"help" — given that "doing nothing"

cannot succeed, finds helpless.)

or unpleasant

insert, former

used, adherent?

Desire to "keep control of developments" (aiming to win
near back, or stop part...)

Acheson says, blockade gives the initiative, control,

But would we "keep control" if we strike?

From that Ultimate will both provide warning
and will lead to counter-ultimatum.
(and pressure from allies)

Post-crisis focus/plan could have been on hand!

Acheson, or Stevenson!

(Only one (?) who wanted [in after 17 Oct: that
no

was the rule! Other, too, were "super-downs"
on first reaction: 15, 16, 17 Oct

! also, give Prod initial
saw reaction.

Oct 89

Issues:

- Gov. control over military
- Military resistance to NOD, or to lack of ^{only} counter-offensive
or to unilateral measures
- Thus, likelihood of SC unilateral measures toward NOD
- SC attitude toward balance in Europe

and/or toward prospects for offensive

and/or worth of offensive cap.

[SC unilat. suggests SC demand toward NATO

"options": maneuvering, Power... Epstein

on one or both counts (balance, offensive)

though they might have concluded that, although
they were strong, & stronger (they say this) it wasn't
worth it, on balance.

Election thing

Maybe K did want to wait till after election to use
missiles politically: so as 1) to minimize objection Right pressure
on JFK to act; 2) to avoid max. arguing, making of JFK (who then could not
more deal)

Ask Lums

(But - did he not worry about missiles
before election, to in election?! as what I was
hoping, in 1960!

How later this?!
~~to be~~

Yes, as he said, avoid giving JFK (max) trouble
before election.

Get?
(Write me to hsr, Nov? 1969 - "What do you
have in mind?")

(See my "helping" LSR et al. by not telling him)
+ MHH, Kilo, Wanda
Was I wrong? I don't see it.

To Newstead, on my destroying hsr:

I had just saved him - 1970 - from Physics Div.

(inbound - greeted, along with RAND letter -
had already known him. with his exception)

Hyp: (see Ridge p. 6: McN)

blockade seen as necessary precursor to
deal (on Turkey)

(vs. Stevenson: do it now then
JFK handling right, on treaties,
w/ SU
and to Right)

Strategy (McN):

Blockade, the

negot/deal.

(and do it before

as strike team was)

(Why would K give up 2nd objection,
every before (which Turkey deal precludes, was done
only for supe, but alone prevents, on RBMs; SU deal)

unless: 1) blocked from it, by blockade

ask Lewis:

Were not JFK warnings too late: minds about/already
there, in Cuba?

Was this considered, by RFR/Sor/R, JFK?

Was it like UK bilateral commitment to Poland, after Prague

— imply a path to a crisis / potential escalation?

(Did Polithuro wrong, at the point?)

Wf not?

Could K have withdrawn?

e.g. after JFK - Gromyko talk?

K clearly thought: JFK has not decided to do X (what) if A.

or if he has — HAD HE, BY MKG STANDARDS? —

he will change his mind

(or bluff)

WRONG

Note SNIE, Oct 17: K will have planned/decided what
to do if this fails.

of VN, too;

1) [Lesson: That is after understand of with will;
not even, seriously weighed, considered, planned, calculated;
"we'll see; we'll cross that bridge..."]

2. On the other hand, a "warning" to enemy
(to reassure our public / friends) may lead to planning &
preps — to keep advocates of action within Admin (JCS, Defense)
from leading to outside circles that no such preps are
going on ("a bluff") —

which do shape feasible options — some ready,
others not prepared — if contingency does arise,
or if some other, unforeseen challenge arises

(brink / cocking of guns)

or one is angry, inhibited, frustrated — ready for violence.

"boldness"

"manliness" =

Feb 5, 1989

For Louis: Centralization?

(i) K saw US as acting illegally in Cuba
at previous illegal invasions;

and when did
K expect invasion?

What if it came

first?

(Oct 20?)

just thought US would accept minutes (and give
up invasion) once they were there?

US fear of LVA?

or if low retal, if minutes attended?

(duplicate low inferiority, again),

after minutes destroyed?

Very unthinkable in Cuba — as to

capture; any cover for that?

For instability? (extreme!)

(2) ~~US~~ would blockade if SO announced study;

just will accept if done as FA

[but what if disclosed?! and even at public affairs
(see on 0-2!) of big kind to.

Blatantly: and one (no US) to buy up power (of rights)
as the issue, that made a crisis inevitable.

He wanted cheap power; but thought
mistakenly (as did MCN!) that they were
"strong enough to assert power."

258

or, the first step toward it.

and power came 10 years later. (1972!)

(Deb: yes)

For Louis: 1, or 2 RFK-Dole meetings?

Had RFK, on Rush, hinted at Turkish deal?

For Louis: Why emphasize JFK had not decided to
invade (i.e. 48 hrs) on Oct 27; believe, on Oct 1-6!

3) Wanted to call later idea Oct 27 planning + hints,
like Oct 1-15 planning, "routine contingency planning"?!

6) Note: the talk of his "contingency planning" with Rush — Condon
as if he had decided 1) to settle on K's terms, if necessary; 2) not to
threaten.

cf.
Alexeev article on CII

1988

Feb 5, 1988

For Lovers:

- Were more missiles intended?!

By hint?

- Wf much to construct after Oct 22?

- Wf was B K's move a "adventure" — given that
the risks were, apparently, not seen by any advisers
involved? Should it have foreseen US response?!

(Exclusion of ... American experts?)

[First stage of a Faint Acropolis is now
like a Covert Action: it has the risks + limitations
of a CA — and the
temptations...

- Who proposed Sinyo deal to Delors? When? 309

Note: after all the lesson-learning:

VN

Opposition (Cyberpunkin)

The end race

What lessons were really learned — by whom?

(e.g., by successors to JFK and K
and their advisers? (and!))

- Wf the message in Berlin, + message in elections
(to state a US warning / commitment or calm?)

SHOULD US (JFK) RESPONSE HAVE BEEN FORESEEN?

WITH WHAT PROB?

WHY? AS DEPENDING ON WHAT?

If so, what do we infer

about the risk of war / war
war!

US MILITARY SUPERIORITY?
US EMPIRE / TRADITION IN CARIB?

US LAWLESSNESS? MILITARISM?

US DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION OF

SUPERIOR RIGHTS, STATUS?

(UNREADINESS FOR EQUAL TREATMENT?

HUMILIATION OF PRESIDENT

297 300

363

Reference:

Either JFK never really wanted to invade
(but spec; the)

or prospect of war with Soviet deterred him.
(~~stop~~ from USSR VN, Korea)

(like attacking China, 1949; or after 1950; or in VN)
or missing Hanoi: D didn't do it.

(But N did; + did)

Beas in: Should he have considered
it thats?)

2. Was belief that US couldn't discover (from air)

crypto?

If concealed? (Soviet failed to decrypt?)

SI rather was known; and seeing in SU.
from rats

Then belief is wrong, was pragmatic crypto?

(Look at JFK, McN, inhibitions a air strike
or mission)

and/or: was K assumption that just before election

(construction phase) JFK would keep secret

[Hyp: "He wants to invade Cuba, but not

to fight Soviet; and Soviet invade

is assured by presence [troops would do this—

he sent them too! But he also wanted

to effort balance]; JFK will want to break

off." So, he went and promised on his for attack before election

(No Russian has said this; but it could be

plausible — SU troops and inside presence is distant,

not "operational" — i.e. there is no "specifically unreliable, but

promoted" force — US has to assume operational about from this

of presence [possibility of missiles hidden under them!]

Oct 89

Doc Laws

- on ^{SU} interpretation of

- 1973 ^{US} Alert = ME (see Meefuier, 219)

Principles

- Tank Half attack (Did Laws ever commit
or abandon of attack?)

- Pleider (Korzyz visit)

- Attack on US: Brink's, Ben Naa, Pleider

// - Wf that version its East Germany
"world war," or making war "inevitable"?

- State fear of Western invasion

(Meefuier)

- SS-18 (How does it differ from SS-20?)

(^{meat IV} test can you as Julia speech?)

see Meefuier

darabier, FA sum 88
1005

("error: SS-20

officer

KAL-007

(Gorbachev final Sept 1984

Krasnoyarsk

(Making (?) Ortega come to Moscow?

198... (was that Gorbachev?)

RUST, May 87

✓ that harder :)

- IFR buildup after Gorbachev?

- MCN Ann Arbor speech

- Gorbachev speech

- What were SU and in Berlin, 1958-62, 1962
Cline

Perestroika

5 Nov 89

- Ask Sam: How much is all this due to
Carter-Ragan "policy of strength,"
build-up?
To SDE?

- Was that necessary, given Holbrooke?

- Did it help bring Holbrooke, or New Thinking?

- ~~What~~ Were there alternate ways to bring this -
under B, A, C?

- Is US economy the best model?

Statedman?

(A pity that prestigious economists now
are Reaganites?)

It should have been:

Hites & Bonds?

Alphons, Tump?

Shawn?

Reich

Dick Parker

Leontis?

Frank Block?

Daniel?

Seungye, MR...

How about: West Germany, esp. SDP

Austria, Scandinavian

Japan?

NT? Elmerwood's/Casper's New Paradigm?!

(Didn't I give Volokhov The Jung Point?)

5 Nov 89

- Ask Soviets:

- What did you and / party see as the
occasion for the blitzing?

- or, what were the intentions?

- Did the see convergence of troops?

- What if this was there on WTO?

(or McPherson

or Sanger: SU MIC

and later

(Shukko and Brylman)

SOVS NOW TAKE SERIOUSLY

(SAUL MENDLOWITZ'S) AIM: PREVENTION OF WAR

(esp. "would war";

US-SU non-use war

NATO -

Numer: and to change: — derivation of East Gov,
which regime an offensive
WTO strategy

- and has needs of encouraging
NATO intention

(Rogers: Huntington)

- (~~What~~ - SU non-use offensive
position

- (not of prevention,
but COW, CUA,

McN: { early "second use"
{ (or any second use)

(Realistically, any second use is bad / fatal for
for SU survival.) (as for US)

Sunday 3 Oct 87

Z

for - send Fed express?

Reifer - library:

Stirling Good

MCB?

When are specials? Who?

media

Cozy Shearn

When do they need word?

Lloyd Shearn

Byzule?

Hersh

What can they do?

Comins

MHH [how to say?]

Kittler

Fred Kaplan - Jan Olfendick

Klar

Allison

Bernstein

(Maz)

Kittler

Reinstadt

Rosenberg

Blight - Blight 1 1/2 dozen

Frankenberg

Wade

Lebow

Van Evers

Heathoff

(Havlicek)

Heathoff

Landau

Kayser

IF Stone

Rathjens

Zim

Forsberg

Chomsky

Mack

Skinner

Haffner?

Schulz

Rye

Comins Houghton

914-682-0488

R 964-0074

Did Carter say to Byzule = (not just "Sovs controlled/delivered" but

U Thant memoirs: View from the UN (Harden City, N.Y.,

Darlington 1978, p. 128

"The shot, Carter did not...?"

Blight 3 Oct 87

[Hyp: Put Klare to sponsor a scholarly seminar on
either Oct 14, 15 or 16 or Oct 9? (Friday
- invite Harvard - MIT list - Brandeis (faculty?)

and Klare
letters +
docs

- Klare to attract media attention:

Talbott, Time

Woodward?

Fred Kaplan, Globe - or Cliphart

Jed Kappell

PBS, PRS... (Mankiewicz)

NYT - Op Ed (Hush)

- Check first:

* Hantsoff ^W

Saunders ^W (Hush)

Ball ^{NY?}

(Russians?) at Harvard

Castro - London

* Kalman ^C

McG B ? NY

(Szule?)

Franzini?

Zorin?

Ridgely (Consul - General) ^{NY}

* Rathjens

Riviera?

(Fubini ?!)

Hush - sources?

Explains (w/ earlier optimism?)

What can he do/suggest?

(re-read: Nitze

my notes

Discussion

Final ASW

Harvard + Rand

Klunder

Hilman

~~several~~

Hotel
Havana Riviera, Havana Cuba

305-051

Saul Kunder

102-880-

Fawcett - Santa Rosa

Blight:

Mon - Wed

2:30

300 students

Museum Age Hist. + Humanities Center
Research

Trachtenberg - Trachtenberg

Prof. Michael Klare
Vanderbilt College
Amherst

01002

Belmont - Shuman
Medford - Truett
Shuman

484-9035

19 Lincoln Rd.
Belmont

02178

(learn of
relating this)

USC - By Hersh -
Bart Bernstein

KPFA Ray Contine

"Proud to know both
of you"

Oct 9, 9 AM - with
Vally + Rasm Belmire
841-4723

Cody Shuman
202-462-6070

Off. 391-0343
Medford
Mass. 02155

26 West Street
Boston, Mass.